[영문번역] A Chance to Exercise Military Sovereignty 국제안보

 [ JoongAng Ilbo, May 18, 2013 ] KOREA FOCUS

 

If we are to take the initiative in creating a new regional order of peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia, there should be no snag to our takeover of the wartime operational control of troops from Washington in 2015. Our country is still relying on the United States for its wartime operational control of troops, although it is the world's 15th largest economy, has seventh largest defense budget in the world, and has hosted the Summer Olympics and the World Cup.

Our defense budget is more than four times that of North Korea, yet some people in our society don't have any qualms about arguing that South Korea, is still inferior to the North in terms of military strength and that it still lacks the ability to manage combat operations and troops without the U.S. military`s help. In contrast, Israel, whose economic size is one-seventh of South Korea, has been exercising military sovereignty nearly perfectly in dealing with rich Arab countries with a combined population of 300 million, while spending about half of our country's defense budget. Isn't this shameful?

The current South Korea-U.S. combined defense system is abnormal. It depends upon the American commanding officer, who is responsible for the "Korean Theater of Operations" in accordance with the strategic guidelines of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), to make important decisions that determine South Korea's security. During peacetime, the commanding officer of the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), a U.S. four-star general, fulfills key military functions, including determining whether there is a crisis on the Korean peninsula, implementing war plans, and conducting joint exercises. But he is nothing but the commanding officer of a subordinate unit of the USPACOM, which will take over the control of the CFC if war erupts on the peninsula.

The CFC commander, who relies on the USPACOM's strategic guidelines for Northeast Asia, reports to the U.S. Congress every year but has never appeared at the South Korean National Assembly. In addition, the CFC commander has ignored the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) whenever it attempts to give new strategic guidelines, calling them “unnecessary interference.” Under these circumstances, the assertion that South Korea and the United States are exercising their respective military sovereignty on equal terms under the current CFC system is not convincing.

The reality is the opposite. In 1994 when the Korean peninsula was on the brink of war, General Gary Luck, then CFC commander, traveled all the way to the White House and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff headquarters to discuss the crisis. But he never informed the South Korean government of what he discussed. Right after North Korea shelled Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, the chairman of the South Korean JCS asked the then CFC Commander, General Walter Sharp, to "discuss a plan to launch a counterstrike on the North by air power." However, Sharp washed his hands of the emergency, saying it was up to the South Korean government to decide. While he was trying not to get embroiled in a limited local skirmish between the two Koreas, all he did was wait for guidance from Washington.

The CFC, which has no discretionary authority of its own, has served as both an asset for South Korea's security and a liability. Sometime in the future in case of emergency on the peninsula, we will face a strategic choice between achieving reunification and keeping the peninsula divided. In this situation, our military's dialogue partner shouldn't be the commander of the CFC, a subordinate operational unit of the USPACOM, but either the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff or the commander of the USPACOM.

If the wartime operational control of troops is transferred, South Korean armed forces, which have become a major military entity, will take the initiative in strategic operations, while their U.S. counterparts, the world's military superpower, will provide support. Then it will be possible to seek an integrated command system, while ironing out inefficiencies in the current command system that operates differently in wartime and peacetime.

This is a desirable future blueprint for the South Korean armed forces on a grand strategy to pursue reunification and prosperity while taking care of allies and neighbors. It was possible for Seoul and Washington to agree on transferring wartime operational control because there was consensus between the militaries of the two countries about a new security system based on each country's sovereignty. We should make good on our agreement with an ally, no matter how difficult it is. After reneging on our promise, how can we pursue genuine security or discuss national dignity in the future?

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